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Democratization as a Global Phenomenon 
and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations 
THOMAS BRUNEAU and HAROLD TRINKUNAS 
The most recent wave of democratization has placed control over military and security forces in 
the hands of elected officials in more countries than ever before. Despite the implications of this 
trend for international security, scholarly work on democratization and civil-military relations 
has tended to focus on purely local actors, interests, and strategies when explaining outcomes. 
When the impact of global trends is considered at all, the focus has been on imitation e~ects 
or structural changes in the international system. This is at odds with the reality that the Inter-
national community has deliberately created a large number of programmes and institutions to 
promote democratization. This article argues that global democracy promotion efforts by 
leading powers, such as the United States and members of the European Union, have propa-
gated a particular liberal understanding of civil-military relations which, in most parts ~f 
the world, has clearly privileged civilian control over two other elements of democratic 
civil-military relations, defence efficiency and military effectiveness. However, in the face of 
emerging transnational threats, new and old democracies have begun to focus once again on 
the dimensions of effectiveness and efficiency in their security sectors. 
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Introduction 
It has become common to think of democratization as a global phenomenon. The 
designation 'third wave of democracy' makes it clear that observers believe the group 
of democracies that emerged in the wake of Portugal's transition in 1974 had an 
impact on one another, at least in terms of timing and proximity. The puzzle is that 
most of the literature on democratic transitions views the phenomenon of democratic 
transitions as inextricably linked to local circumstances, political leaders, and strategic 
decisions. I To the extent that theorists have identified global linkages to explain 
the latest wave of democratization, explanations attribute it to either imitation 
effects on a regional level or a shift in the global zeitgeist that favours democracy? 
This theoretical perspective appears to be at odds with the reality of myriad major 
efforts by the United States, European countries, and international organizations to 
promote democratization through political and economic incentives such as foreign 
aid, accession to regional treaty organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and most recently, a new 
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'Wilsonianism' in US foreign policy that associates at least minimal democratization 
with the maintenance of state sovereignty and legitimacy.3 Democratization as a 
global trend with an impact on security issues has only been seriously explored by 
the proponents of 'democratic peace theory' , who argue that insofar as democracies 
do not fight each other, waves of democratization tend to reduce the likelihood 
of international conflict.4 Critics such as Jack Snyder counter by pointing out that 
emerging democracies are conflict-prone, while others point to emerging but poorly 
understood transnational threats that target democratic societies.5 
The third wave of democratization has been accompanied by an unprecedented 
shift in civil-military relations that has placed more power and instruments of 
control in the hands of elected leaders than at any other time in history. Pure military 
dictatorships have become exceedingly rare, as are military coups d'etat. Such is the 
global compulsion towards maintaining at least the appearance of democracy that the 
traditional military dictatorship has been replaced by the emergence of qualified semi-
democracies with civilian leaders clearly in charge despite their reliance on armed 
force to rule.6 Tellingly, scholars of democratic civil-military relations have rarely, 
and not even systematically, examined the impact of democratization as a global 
trend on civil-military relations. Even more than democratization, civil-military 
relations has been treated as a product of domestic political interaction on which inter-
national forces have little influence. Practically the only argument of any currency 
that takes seriously the impact of global forces is that which points to the nefarious 
influence of US military training, particularly in Latin America; as this article will 
point out, however, significant US and other international assistance actually has 
focused on improving civilian control of the military since the 1980s.7 Examination 
of the role of international democracy promotion in reforming police and para-military 
forces is even less common than that which focuses on civil-military relations.s 
Once we take democratization seriously as a global phenomenon with an impact 
on civil-military relations, we are led to explore an important set of new phenomena. 
First, the empowering of civilian political leaders, who often have little or no back-
ground on security issues and may be suspicious of the armed forces, is likely to 
alter the ways states approach security issues. In particular, this change in authority 
and control over budgets and resources produces shifts in national defence strategies, 
military capabilities, and defence spending, with their consequent impact on neigh-
bouring states' threat perceptions.9 Similarly, to the extent democracies are indeed 
unlikely to fight each other, as seems the case among the members of well-established 
security communities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the 
European Union (EU), and the economic community that is the Mercado Comtin del 
Sur (Mercosur), democratization is likely to foster a search for new roles and missions 
for the armed forces. For example, the emergence of South America as a major source 
of peacekeeping forces gives additional international status and credibility to Merco-
sur partners and associates Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. Most importantly, 
the US and Europe have launched and sustained a major effort to export their charac-
teristically liberal understanding of civil-military relations to new democracies 
around the world. Although largely uncoordinated, the emphasis on civilian control 
is remarkably consistent, but it has not previously been systematically studied. 
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The impact of global democratization trends on civil-military relations is 
examined by focusing on the linkages that have allowed the US and Europe to trans-
mit their civil-military doctrine and practices to emerging democracies. Democracy 
promotion by these leading powers has structured the globalization of a particular 
'liberal' understanding of civil-military relations which, in most parts of the world, 
has clearly privileged civilian control over the other two elements of democratic 
civil-military relations: defence efficiency and military effectiveness. 10 Interestingly, 
the almost exclusive focus on civilian control is tempered in very particular circum-
stances by the traditional security requirements produced by either the international 
environment, such as the Cold War, or by alliance structures such as NATO and 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The privileging of civilian control in other parts of 
the world has led many countries to place too little emphasis on developing effective 
and efficient defence establishments. Paradoxically, leading powers have also pro-
vided military assistance in the fights against terrorism and illegal drugs, prevention 
of human rights abuses, and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, while at 
the same time neglecting to focus on promoting effectiveness and efficiency. In our 
conclusion, we suggest that we may begin to see a shift in emphasis within new 
democracies towards defence efficiency and effectiveness, yet the shift is likely to 
be uneven and chaotic in many states, particularly the vast majority that lack explicit 
national security strategies or defence planning processes. 
This article is not intended to provide a definitive answer regarding the relation-
ship between international democratization trends and civil-military relations. Rather, 
it focuses on explaining the impact of a particular liberal understanding of civil-
military relations on emerging democracies in the past 25 years. The article first 
examines the origins of democracy promotion programmes by the US and Europe 
from the beginning of the 'third wave', and their impact on civil-military relations 
in emerging democracies. It analyses the circumstances under which global democ-
racy promotion has tended to focus almost exclusively on issues of civilian control. 
The account then turns to examining the potential impact of democracy promotion 
on defence efficiency and military effectiveness in new democracies. The article con-
cludes with some conjectures on how emerging transnational threats are affecting the 
current configuration of civil-military relations in new democracies, and how this may 
be forcing a shift towards greater attention to the output, in terms of security, of the 
defence sector in these countries. 
Democracy Promotion and the Spread of Civilian Control 
of the Armed Forces 
In the contemporary era, after the imposition of democracy by the democratic victors of 
World War Two in Germany, Italy, and Japan, and more recently on a small scale in 
Grenada and Panama, the beginning of explicit democracy-building programmes is 
synonymous with the advent of the so-called 'third wave' of democratization. Samuel 
Huntington has suggested the 'third wave' began on 25 April 1974 with the military 
coup in Portugal that became a revolution, and ultimately opened the way to democrati-
zation, not only in Portugal but also in Spain, Greece, and then in South America. I I 
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While the rhetoric of US foreign policy may long have enshrined the promotion of 
democracy as a mission, the US did not being to think seriously about what tools it 
needed to carry out such a mission until it began to react to democratization in 
southern Europe. The democracy promotion model established at the beginning of 
the 'third wave' in revolutionary Portugal in the mid- and late-1970s is essentially 
the same as is followed today, but with unprecedented growth and institutionalization 
of the actors, instruments, and resources involved. This model is far more complex 
than what is proposed by analyses in the scholarly literature on international determi-
nants of democratization which, in our view, are too general. I2 By focusing on 
democratic zeitgeists or contagion effects, these theories overlook the specific diplo-
matic instruments and bargaining strategies employed by states and international 
institutions to foster particular kinds of democracy. Aside from the reports of 
those directly involved, we can only imagine what kinds of promises and threats 
are made along the way, including military diplomacy, utilizing demarches, 
'non-papers', cajoling, and other informal instruments of power. Similarly, arguments 
about democratic contagion effects are generally structural, and they do not 
account for the strategic behaviour of a wide variety of external actors in transition 
processes, which seems strange because democratization theory does a good job of 
explaining the impact of this type of activity by domestic actors. 13 What is lacking 
in the contagion analysis is a description of the explicit mechanisms that promote 
democratic civil-military relations. We are unlikely to acquire detailed knowledge 
of the diplomatic strategies major powers use in specific instances, but we can 
begin to get a sense of the general approach by focusing on their democracy 
promotion programmes and the resources they commit to them. 14 
The Origins of Contemporary Democracy Promotion: The Portuguese 
Revolution 1974 
The 1974 Portuguese revolution galvanized the international promotion of democracy 
and set the current pattern for external actors to support 'third wave' democracies. It 
must be stated up front and forcefully, however, that the coup of 25 April 1974 that 
began the revolution took place with no foreign involvement, and, for that matter, no 
foreign awareness. Once begun, the archaic political structure of the Salazar dictator-
ship, based fundamentally on repression, collapsed and opened the way for a political 
radicalization that was stoked by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and other 
rapidly forming parties and movements to its left. The Soviet Union and its surrogates 
quickly became deeply involved, Portugal underwent revolutionary changes, its colo-
nies were given independence, and Portuguese foreign policy shifted far to the left. In 
that era, when Richard Nixon was president of the US and Henry Kissinger secretary 
of state or national security advisor, Washington was extremely concerned by radical 
changes in a NATO ally that provided important military bases for defence against the 
Soviet Union, as well as out-of-area operations such as during the October 1973 
Arab-Israeli war. 15 Initially, the US was unwilling to accept a major political uphea-
val in Portugal, even though the changes taking place had already escaped beyond its 
control. This virtual paralysis in US policy (that in retrospect was better than some of 
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the possible alternatives, such as supporting an intervention from Spain) opened 
the way for European political involvement, thereby initiating a pattern that has 
been frequently repeated since 1974. 16 
The Europeans, chiefly the Germans and Norwegians, through their leadership of 
the Socialist International, moved into the vacuum to encourage a democratic direc-
tion for Portugal. 17 This required countering the efforts of both the PCP and radical 
officers in one sector of the Armed Forces Movement. They did this initially by 
providing resources to strengthen the nascent democratic forces in Portugal, which 
were very weak and extremely fragmented. The instruments they utilized were 
basically the Stijtullgen (foundations) of the three major German political parties, 
the Konrad Adenauer, Friedrich Ebert, and Friedrich Neumann foundations, and 
the national (in Germany and Belgium) as well as international offices of the 
labour unions. These groups encouraged Portuguese would-be or proto-democratic 
politicians, union leaders, journalists, and agricultural cooperative leaders to build 
democratic institutions, by helping to educate and train them, fund democracy-building 
efforts and provide them with the technical means (printing presses, telephones, and the 
like) to do their political work. IS 
The European powers were extremely active in the Portuguese democratic tran-
sition, and the success they achieved became obvious to the world very quickly. 
Meanwhile, once Washington became convinced that Portugal was not 'lost to com-
munism' - a change of heart brought about by the excellent team that Ambassador to 
Lisbon Frank Carlucci assembled to work on the issues - the US found that it lacked 
the instruments to assist Portuguese democratic forces in anything like the same 
manner as the Europeans. What the US had was the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), which was not looked upon very positively by the Nixon and Ford adminis-
trations since it had failed to predict the coup of 25 April, and the agency was just 
beginning to face scrutiny by the Church and Pike committees in the US Senate 
and House of Representatives respectively. The alternative, the US Agency for Inter-
national Development (US AID), was at the time barred from providing funds for 
political programmes. The US labour movement did become involved in Portugal, but 
not effectively since its methods of operation, not to mention ideological orientation, 
were very different from its European counterparts and had little traction in the 
radicalized political environment of the Portuguese revolution. 19 
As the Europeans helped put content into the basic and preliminary institutions 
of Portuguese democracy, the US and other major economic powers would begin 
to shape the overall development of Portugal. That is, they provided economic 
support though the US Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund and the World 
Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, to 
ensure that Portugal would develop as a pluralist democracy and not a communist dic-
tatorship. As Portugal was the first transition of the third wave, democratic contagion 
effects were not relevant. Indeed, the contagion effect would have been more likely to 
push for a return to fascist dictatorship given the concern the US and Spain had 
regarding the radicalization of the Portuguese Revolution.2o 
The above analysis is more or less generally accepted among scholars, although 
there is little literature explicitly describing developments in Portugal. What is less 
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well understood is the military dimension of Portuguese democratization and that it 
had an !mportant influence on the development of current international p~ogrammes 
promotmg democratic civil-military relations. Portugal's preceding authoritarian 
regime, which was controlled by civilians, had been in place since 1930. A sector 
of the ~ou~g ?ffic~rs who had led the coup in 1974 intended that the new regime 
would mstltutlOnalIze a predominant role for the armed forces in government. It 
was not their intention to establish a democratic regime based on free and fair elec-
tions. The counterstrategy developed by the US, Germany, and NATO itself sought to 
wean the officers out of politics and into more purely professional activities, largely 
through their inclusion in NATO missions. Obviously there were certain individuals, 
namely General Ramalho Eanes, who was elected president in 1976 and again in 
198~, and the leaders of the three democratic parties, who played a large role in pre-
ventmg the establishment of a military regime. But what is most important is that the 
US, Germany, and others had the institutional framework of NATO within which to 
develop and implement their strategy. Furthermore, the NATO allies could provide 
powerful incentives to Portuguese officers through their ability to provide modem 
training and equipment.21 In other words, the external actors had something of signifi-
cant value to offer the Portuguese military to encourage it to get out of government 
and out of politics. This was the first time that these strategies, actors, and instruments 
were used to promote a democratic transition and later democratic consolidation. 
What can be learned from the experience of Portugal at the beginning of the 'third 
,":av~'? First is the need for external actors to be flexible when supporting democra-
tizatIOn. Nobody, not the Portuguese themselves (with the possible exception of the 
200 young officers who were the instigators), the US, or NATO, was prepared for 
the coup that became a revolution. Once it began, the Europeans, especially the 
Germans, used their foundations and other organizations to influence developments 
and put Portugal on a democratic path. Second, the role of external security consider-
ations in shaping defence reform appears to be significant. The military dimension of 
democratization in Portugal took place in the context of the Cold War, when base 
access and NATO unity were critically important for US and European national 
security. There were real international security reasons to integrate the Portuguese 
fully into NATO, to assist them in being effective and efficient participants in 
NATO missions, and at the same time to assist in the consolidation of Portuguese 
democracy. Third, once the value of foundations, labour organizations and the 
like were proven in Portugal, they were then repeatedly called on throughout the 
'third wave' of democratization. The common dominator in these programmes is 
the promotion of political learning, whereby individuals and groups in the 'third 
wave' democracies can understand how their predecessors created and manage 
their democratic institutions. 
Contemporary Democracy Promotion Programmes 
and Civil-Military Relations 
The historical evolution of the third wave from southern Europe to South America and 
Central America, East-Central Europe, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa was not directly 
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caused by specific programmes implemented by major powers, but rather by an 
interaction of domestic and international factors. Once a given transition began, 
however, whether for endogenous reasons or in reaction to an external shock, and 
certainly as countries seemed to be consolidating new regimes, democratizers 
could benefit from a myriad of programmes to support this consolidation. In a rela-
tively early monograph, Larry Diamond surveyed the remarkable variety of actors 
and programmes engaged in democracy promotion.22 Democracy promotion has 
become big business, and the US now has a wide array of programmes at its disposal. 
Following the lead of Germany and its foundations, Congress created the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1984. NED supports, at least in part, a series 
of other organizations including the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), foundations associated with the two major 
US political parties. USAID, through its Office of Democracy and Governance, 
helps its field missions design and implement democracy strategies, provides techni-
cal and intellectual leadership in the field of democracy development, and manages 
some USAID programmes directly. In Fiscal Year 2006, the agency's basic Democ-
racy and Governance programmes will cost about US$37 million. The US AID Office 
of Transitional Initiatives also supports democratizers during the very initial stages of 
regime change. In terms of funding, the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of 
the Armed Forces, for example, had a 2005 budget of $11 million, and the US Inter-
national Military Education and Training (IMET) 2005 budget was just short of $90 
million. Private and international initiatives have also gained prominence. Billionaire 
George Soros established the Open Society Institute, one of the most famous of the 
private foundations that support one or another element of democracy; the United 
Nations Foundation, funded by American media tycoon Ted Turner, has also 
become engaged in this field. Other prominent actors include the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the EU, and the Organization of American States. 
These programmes deal to a large extent with the basic elements of democracy such 
as the media, non-governmental organizations, electoral systems, and political parties.23 
It is nevertheless remarkable that, despite all the work to promote democratic 
civil-military relations, there has been virtually no systematic assessment of the 
roles external actors have played in shaping civil-military relations in the third 
wave. To highlight this, it is worth noting that the highly regarded Freedom House 
index, which rates freedom globally, does not include a variable dealing with security, 
defence, and the relations between military and civilians.24 The few academic studies 
of democratic civil-military relations rarely include a reference to the impact of exter-
nal assistance programmes. Felipe Aguero's 1995 monograph on civil-military 
relations during Spain's transition to democracy, for example, only briefly discusses 
the influence of NATO accession on the domestic interplay between military and civi-
lian actors, despite the fact that accession to NATO and the EU caused major public 
debates before, during, and after Spain's democratic transition and, according to 
Aguero, assisted the transition.25 There is, in short, no literature that deals with 
civil-military relations in which the effect of foreign programmes and relationships 
is systematically analysed. In part, this is because the literature on democratization 
has tended to emphasize the pre-eminence of domestic factors in explaining 
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the construction of new regimes, and secondarily, because few of the practitioners 
of democracy promotion in the area of civil-military relations write for academic 
audiences, often because they are employed by governments and militaries of the 
developed world that do not encourage such publications. 
Coupled with the failure to assess the impact of external actors is an absence of 
any systematic survey of the programmes that promote democratic civil-military 
relations themselves. Jay Cope's short monograph on the IMET programme, and 
an even shorter survey by Hans Born of programmes that deal more or less with over-
sight in the security sector, are the only such published studies we know of.26 It is 
shocking that even in the case of the US government there is not a comprehensive 
listing of the programmes that provide support for defence reform, civilian oversight 
of the security sector, and civil-military relations. This is despite the fact that they are 
funded, directly or indirectly, by the US government, and are thus obliged to follow its 
reporting and auditing requirements. There have been only two systematic attempts to 
survey the programmes funded by the US: a limited inventory conducted by the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in October 2002; and a more comprehensive survey 
mandated by and conducted for the powerful office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy in 2003, the results of which have not been publicly released. 
What became obvious from the NPS assessment of a large number of government 
programmes that support democratic civil-military relations through training or edu-
cation, is that every component of the US military education and training endeavour 
includes some form of international outreach. There is a glaring problem with these 
diverse programmes, however, because they fail to make any explicit linkage with, or 
even demonstrate a clear concept of, how they support democratic civil-military 
relations, let alone democratic consolidation. In short, the programmes that support 
democratic civil-military relations are not integrated into the larger field of democ-
racy-building.27 Similarly, Hans Born finds that while there are many organizations 
supporting security sector reform and democratization processes: 
Civil-military relations are apparently not a central issue of parliamentary 
assistance programmes. Mostly military different [sic] institutions, such as 
the NATO or national defence ministries, carry out the assistance programmes 
for promoting democratic civil-military relations but they are not so much 
regarded as being central to parliamentary assistance programmes. 
He continues, 'it seems that assistance programmes for democratic civil-military 
relations and for parliaments are taking place but on different tracks, carried out 
by different aid providers,.28 Clearly the fragmentation of democratic civil-military 
relations efforts pertains in both US and European programmes. 
In the US, besides the much larger programmes supported by foreign military 
sales and financing, there are two main categories of programmes that are oriented 
specifically towards improving democratic civil-military relations. The first include 
those funded by the IMET programme; the second are the regional centres designed 
to promote democratic civil-military relations and security. The IMET programme 
was begun in 1976, and was revised in 1991 after the end of the Cold War. Explicit 
objectives of the IMET programmes include fostering civilian control of the military, 
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promoting human rights, and helping resolve civil-military conflicts. The 2006 IMET 
budget was slightly less than $87 million, and supports a wide variety of democracy 
promotion organizations that are designed to provide education and training in the US 
and abroad. 
The Department of Defense undertook its own initiative in this area beginning in 
1992, and has created five regional centres that seek specifically to promote demo-
cratic civil-military relations (security assistance is included in the Department of 
State appropriation). The first, the George W. Marshall Center in Germany, was 
created in 1992, and its mission statement captures the overall sense of the other 
four: 'The mission of the Marshall Center is to create a more stable security environ-
ment by advancing democratic institutions and relationships, especially in the field 
of defence; promoting active, peaceful security cooperation; and enhancing enduring 
partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe and Eurasia. ,29 In addition 
to the Marshall Center, the Department of Defense has founded and generously funds 
the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 
the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (for Latin America), and the newest, 
founded in 2000, the Near East and South Asia Center. The budget for these regional 
centres easily rivals the total size of the IMET budget. Thus, with nearly US$200 
million per year committed to democratic civil-military relations promotion, the US 
government effort easily exceeds that of other countries that also have programmes, 
such as the Swiss Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 
and smaller organizations in Canada and Britain.3D 
The content of the different IMET and regional centre programmes puts the empha-
sis overwhelmingly on civilian control. Defence efficiency (using limited resources 
rationally and with the least possible waste) comes in after that at a very distant 
second. They also give minimal attention to the promotion of effectiveness in the 
implementation of military roles and missions (getting the assigned job done with 
the resources and within the time allotted). The only programmes where effectiveness 
is included as a key element are those of NATO, the PfP, and in peacekeeping and 
counter-terrorism education and training. This highlights an important dichotomy 
among programmes that promote democratic civil-military relations: there are those 
that promote both military effectiveness and defence efficiency on an equal basis 
with civilian control, mostly for new NATO and PfP countries; and there are those 
that focus solely on civilian control. This is even stranger when we discover that the 
US Department of Defense guidance to combatant commanders on security assistance 
emphasizes all three elements of the defence trinity. It should be noted that in the non-
democratic regimes of the original PfP members, civilians did control the armed 
forces; they just were not democratically elected civilians.31 
Since the end of the Cold War, the PfP, which serves as both a pathway into NATO 
and a way to engage countries that are not members of NATO, has reinforced and 
made very clear the importance of all aspects of the trinity of civil-military relations. 
Point 1 of the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building states: 
The Member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council reaffirm their 
conviction that effective and efficient state defence institutions under civilian 
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and democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area 
and essential for international security cooperation. They agree to establish a 
Partnership Action Plan to support and sustain further development of such 
institutions across the Euro-Atlantic Area.32 
In short, the PfP plan essentially commits the NATO allies to help the new democ-
racies develop control, effectiveness, and efficiency, goals also promoted in the pro-
grammes sponsored by the NATO School at Supreme Headquarters in Belgium, the 
PfP Training and Education Centers, and the Military Assistance Programme. The 
fact that these elements are essentially prerequisites for NATO accession acts as a 
carrot and a stick for both civilian and military leaders in the new democracies, 
much as did the offer of NATO assistance to Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and 1980s. 
By contrast, programmes to promote democratic civil-military relations in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America focus almost exclusively on civilian control of the military. 
There is no overarching directive framework for the regions similar to NATO and 
PfP, but rather a fragmented menu of programmes. Most of the work sponsored by 
the four Department of Defense regional centres (excluding the Marshall Center), 
IMET institutions, the US National Endowment for Democracy, and the Geneva 
Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces also deal only with the civi-
lian-control element of the defence trinity. This is perhaps not surprising given that 
the previous non-democratic regimes in these three regions were dominated by the 
armed forces, and we therefore should not minimize the achievement that consolidat-
ing civilian control represents. The lack of attention to efficiency and effectiveness of 
the armed forces, however, not only puts national security at risk, it also endangers 
what is likely a tenuous bond of trust between civilians, the new democratic regime 
and the armed forces. 
Explaining Variation in Democratic Civil-Military Relations 
Promotion Programmes 
The split impact of democratization programmes on military effectiveness and 
defence efficiency is striking when we compare the cases of Central Europe with 
those in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This section examines the interests of 
donor and recipient countries in improving each of these aspects of democratic 
civil-military relations. 
In Central Europe, democratization produced governments that focused on all 
elements of democratic civil-military relations because they were eager to accede to 
the EU and NATO. It is true that these alliance structures had strict requirements for civi-
lian control of the military, but they also expected aspirants to achieve significant military 
capabilities compatible with the overall alliance strategy. This provided democratizers 
with an incentive to take the dimensions of civil-military relations other than control 
seriously. It also helped democratic politicians justify continuing investment in the mili-
tary at a time when the likelihood of interstate war in Europe was declining rapidly. 
In the rest of the world, by contrast, politicians - and donor countries - had few 
incentives to maintain significant military capabilities, except in localized instances 
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where interstate conflict was a real possibility, or to achieve particular defence out-
comes. For national politicians, promoting military effectiveness meant strengthening 
the very forces that could potentially overthrow them. It also meant committing a sig-
nificant amount of resources, energy, and government attention to the problem of 
defence reform.33 For the armed services, the possibility of reform under civilian 
rule opened the door to a frightening world in which none of their traditional missions 
would remain sacred. Given the perceived lack of an external threat, particularly in 
Latin America, there was the possibility of being reduced to a mere constabulary 
force?4 Similarly, civilians did not necessarily have the time or the interest, except 
in some situations in Asia where the external threat was high, to formulate national 
strategies and policies. This led them to neglect the definition of clear roles and mis-
sions for their armed forces, or to relate the development of certain capabilities and 
effectiveness with particular national objectives. 
The main concern of donor countries with interests in these parts of the world was 
to prevent local armed forces from abusing their own populations or overthrowing 
their own governments. Beyond that, donors had little interest in military effective-
ness, at least until the 9 j II attacks on the US forced them to re-examine the need 
for capable regional military partners. Even then, international donors, to the extent 
that they promoted military effectiveness, were interested in niche capabilities such 
as counter-drug or peacekeeping operations, none of which justified maintenance 
of the kinds of conventional defence establishments that fit with the traditions and 
self-image of the military establishments of these regions. 
Of these explanations for why military effectiveness receives such varied attention 
in new democracies, probably the most important factor is the motivation of civilian 
leaders, now that the armed forces are generally under control, to promote a capable 
military. At a minimum, better forces would cost more money, and there is no 
obvious electoral gain from pushing for an increased level of effectiveness. Even in 
the NATO and PtP regions, where there are incentives in the form of accession to 
regional alliance structures, it is difficult for elected politicians to sustain programmes 
and obtain the resources required for building effectiveness. Outside this region, achiev-
ing a capable military is rare, even in high threat situations. The case of Colombia, 
where there is a well-recognized threat, is illustrative. The Colombian military resists 
establishing the necessary reforms and institutions to build effectiveness because this 
would require significant structural reforms in their training, organization, and career 
paths and expose them to greater personal risk. In addition, Colombian civilian poli-
ticians do not want to commit the required political capital and energy, even though 
they are the recipients of massive US military aid to do just that.35 In short, civilians 
and officers in most of the world's newer democracies have few incentives to focus 
on their deficiencies when it comes to achieving effectiveness in military roles and mis-
sions. This may be why these countries rarely formulate national security strategies. To 
the best of our knowledge, only Colombia, at the behest of Washington, which is finan-
cing much of the government's fight against insurgencies, and Chile, where it was part 
of the consolidation agenda, have well-developed national security strategies. 
Outside the NATOj PtP region, politicians in aid-recipient countries actually 
have had more incentive to reduce than promote efficiency. One of the few scholars 
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to have taken the impact of democratization on military budgets seriously is Wendy 
Hunter, who demonstrates that politicians will naturally seek to reduce defence 
budgets in order to satisfy the demands of important constituents and stakeholders.36 
Some of the literature on the Argentine transition to democracy suggests that an 
important objective of Argentina's civilian governments after 1983 was to eliminate 
border disputes and foster democratization in neighbouring states, so as to undercut 
the rationale for a large military force?7 Overall, the evidence seems to suggest that 
democratization as an international phenomenon has led politicians to focus on 
defence reduction as part of an overall drive to free resources to meet the demands 
of other constituencies, and not incidentally reduce the ability of the armed 
forces to threaten the security of new regimes.38 
Defence efficiency, understood as the ability to field military capabilities suffi-
cient to satisfy assigned roles and missions at the lowest cost, has been part of 
the international democratization agenda of donor countries only to a limited 
extent. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank appear to have goals con-
gruent with those of politicians in donor countries, to the extent that they consider 
defence spending superfluous. Defence efficiency has been promoted by the major 
donor countries mostly as an aspect of effectiveness. Codified national security 
objectives, in the form either of Defence White Books (popular with European 
donors) or National Security Strategies (popular with the US defence establish-
ment), are seen as a precursor to the rationalization of defence capabilities. Promo-
ters of democratization in the US and Europe have pushed for transparency in 
defence spending as part of the overall drive to reduce interstate tensions, reduce 
corruption, and increase citizen access to defence data in new democracies.39 
Argentina and Chile are engaged in a sustained project to produce an accounting 
of their defence expenditures in a common format, with such goals in mind. Never-
theless, outside Europe and NATO, the purpose of defence efficiency at best is to 
rationalize budget reductions. 
These findings re-emphasize the gap between those democratizing states that 
participate in international alliance structures and those that do not. New NATO 
and PtP countries consider defence efficiency to be important because it allows 
their governments to realign their defence capabilities to meet alliance standards 
more rapidly. It also helps establish the credibility of new NATO partners 
among those of longer standing. In less conflict-ridden regions of the world, 
however, any focus on defence efficiency is undermined by a failure to agree on 
what the roles and missions of the armed forces should be. The US maintains 
that the role of the military in Africa and Latin America essentially should be 
to carry out internal security functions associated with counter-drug operations 
and counter-terrorism, as well as some level of peacekeeping or peace-making. 
Thi limited inventory of roles and missions often does not square with what mili-
tary leaders would prefer. The lack of clarity over what roles and missions should 
be, and how to implement changes, means that governments have no clear idea of 
what defence 'product' they are paying for. In the absence of concrete defence 




There are large gaps in the literature on the impact of international factors on 
democratic consolidation. To begin with, few scholars include external factors in 
their analyses of democratic consolidation. Those studies that do examine the impact 
of democracy promotion programmes focus on the basic components of democracy 
such as electoral systems, political parties, the media and the like, and exclude 
elements of national security and defence, including civil-military relations. There 
also is scant analysis of international programmes that support civil-military relations 
within the context of democratic consolidation. For that matter, there are barely any 
surveys on the spectrum and scope of these programmes. From our research, we find 
the overwhelming emphasis of these programmes is on democratic civilian control. 
The only region where this is not the case lies under the NATO and PfP umbrella, 
where there is an explicit framework for membership that emphasizes effectiveness. 
In the rest of the world, there is an almost total absence of attention to the institutional 
and other requirements for military effectiveness, and a very powerful set of disincen-
tives for this circumstance to change. 
There are, however, two current global trends that may encourage renewed atten-
tion to defence efficiency and effectiveness in the developing (non-NATO/PfP) 
world: peacekeeping and counter-terrorism. Peacekeeping has become a major indus-
try since the end of the Cold War, with the number of both missions and personnel 
expanding substantially. Increasingly, these missions deviate from traditional peace-
keeping into peace enforcement operations in hostile environments. The demands on 
the professionalism and skill of peacekeeping troops have grown, and the eagerness of 
countries to participate has increased as well. This can be explained in part by the 
attractiveness of UN reimbursements for peacekeeping troops, the enhanced inter-
national image garnered by those countries that are major peacekeeper providers, 
and the desirability of new professional roles for militaries in democratizing states. 
One of the side-effects is renewed attention to issues of effectiveness and efficiency 
as new peacekeeping providers interact with more established and professional 
armed forces in these types of operations, creating a demand within democratizing 
states for defence reform. 
Counter-terrorism operations may also provide an impetus for better military 
effectiveness, particularly in those countries that have been the targets of terrorist 
attacks. Here, the momentum for defence reform may still be slowed by domestic 
arguments over the role of the armed forces in internal conflict, threats to civilliber-
ties, and preference for police-led counter-terrorism activities. There is also the 
danger that international donor countries, particularly the US, may emphasize mili-
tary effectiveness at the cost of promoting civilian control of the armed forces. The 
US and the EU are clearly at odds over whether military or police forces are the 
best instruments for counter-terrorism policies, and this divergence may be reflected 
in their programmes that target democratizing states. It is too soon to tell whether 
there will be significant future trade-offs in these areas. 
Finally, there is one very old motivator that may still foster pockets of defence 
effectiveness and efficiency outside existing alliance structures or new missions 
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such as peacekeeping and counter-terrorism: the balance of power. There are parts 
of the world, particularly in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, where tra-
ditional security concerns lead civilian and military leaders to share a preference 
for defence efficiency and military effectiveness. In these cases, however, democra-
tization as a global trend has not necessarily been the prime motivator of defence 
reform. 
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